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Introduction  
The fact that Donald Trump became President in 2016, despite 
losing the popular vote by a substantial margin, has brought renewed 
attention to the Electoral College system.1 In Forging the American 
Nation,2 Shlomo Slonim provides an illuminating account of the process 
that led to this bizarre method of determining the outcome of presi–
dential elections. But Professor Slonim’s book also provides insights 
into the origins of many other structural features of our constitutional 
system that are of questionable value in a modern democracy, such as 
elections by state for the Senate, the Senate’s exclusive exercise of 
legislative authority for treaties and appointments, and the constraints 
on the authority of our central government. 
The book covers the drafting and ratification of the Constitution 
between the years 1787 and 1791,3 and also moves backward into times 
preceding the Articles of Confederation era and forward to the Marshall 
Court’s decisions, culminating with McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819.4 
Although the events it describes are among the most fully documented 
in world history,5 Forging the American Nation provides a new and 
 
1. See Editorial Board, Editorial, Time to End the Electoral College, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 19, 2016, at A26; Kyron Huigens, The Electoral College Is 
Actually Worse Than You Think—Here’s Why, Observer (Feb. 27, 2019, 
4:37 PM), https://observer.com/2019/02/electoral-college-explanation-
popular-vote-loses/ [https://perma.cc/7RJ3-PL7B]; Denise Lu, The Electoral 
College Misrepresents Every State, But Not as Much as You Think, Wash. 
Post (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/ 
how-fair-is-the-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/PX2Y-LUJC]; William 
Petrocelli, Voters in Wyoming Have 3.6 Times the Voting Power That I 
Have. It’s Time to End the Electoral College, HuffPost (Nov. 11, 2017, 4:52 
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/its-time-to-end-the-electoral-college 
_b_12891764 [https://perma.cc/FPT3-C48G]. 
2. Shlomo Slonim, Forging the American Nation, 1787-1791: James 
Madison and the Federalist Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, ed. 
2017). 
3. Id. at 1, 9–10. 
4. Slonim, supra note 2, at 85–90, 205–27; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
5. For just some of the recent books on the subject, see Richard Beeman, 
Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution 
(2009); Michael J. Faber, An Anti-Federalist Constitution: The 
Development of Dissent in the Ratification Debates (2019); Michael 
J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States 
Constitution (2016); Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People 
Debate the Constitution, 1787–88 (2010); Jack N. Rakove, Original 
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 
(1996); David O. Stewart, The Summer of 1787: The Men Who 
Invented the Constitution (2007). 
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valuable perspective on them. Slonim joins other recent authors who 
approach the Convention and ratification process with a degree of 
skepticism, but, in this relatively succinct book, he identifies certain 
themes with unusual clarity and legal precision. In doing so, he also 
offers clear lessons for constitutional interpretation and particular 
support for the Legal Process School’s argument that the structural 
features of the Constitution should not be interpreted strictly, if at all, 
by the courts.6 This review summarizes some of the main themes that 
Professor Slonim describes (Part I) and then discusses the implications 
about contemporary constitutional interpretation that flow from that 
account (Part II). It ends with some specific implications about the 
Electoral College and a pending effort to reform it, the National Popular 
Vote Initiative. 
I. Slonim’s Account 
The story of the book is so familiar as to render even a brief 
summary unnecessary. Instead, this section will describe some of the 
principal themes that emerge from Professor Slonim’s rendition of the 
story. These are the character and fate of James Madison’s nationalist 
ideas, the role of the small states, and the role of slavery. 
Madison is described in popular literature about American history 
as the Father of the Constitution.7 Professor Slonim’s account reveals 
that this sobriquet (and incidentally, his own subtitle) is misleading.8 
To be sure, we tend to view the Constitutional Convention through 
Madison’s eyes, since his notes are the centerpiece of the leading 
document collection on the subject.9 He is also the author of the most 
 
6. For two comprehensive examples of this approach, see Jesse H. Choper, 
Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional 
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (1980) and John 
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(1980). The theory these authors describe developed during the previous three 
decades. 
7. See, e.g., James Madison, Father of the U.S. Constitution, 
ConstitutionFacts.com, https://www.constitutionfacts.com/us-constitu 
tion-amendments/james-madison/ [https://perma.cc/8KPR-KRD9] (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2020); Irving Brant, James Madison: The Father of the 
Constitution, Encyc. Britannica (June 24, 2020), https://www.britan 
nica.com/biography/James-Madison/The-father-of-the-Constitution [https: 
//perma.cc/FX8J-TCC4]; Colleen Sheehan, James Madison: Father of the 
Constitution, Heritage Found. (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/ 
political-process/report/james-madison-father-the-constitution [https://perm 
a.cc/Z43R-MCBW]. 
8. Slonim, supra note 2, at 31.  
9. 1 United States Constitutional Convention, The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, at xv–xvii (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 
(“And from the day of their publication until the present, Madison’s notes 
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noteworthy justifications for the constitutional structure10 and the 
primary draftsman of the Bill of Rights.11 But ascribing parentage to 
Madison obscures the extent to which the Constitution was not in fact 
the product of this great political theorist and visionary, but of a host 
of ordinary politicians, concerned with their own careers, answerable to 
their home-state interests and interest groups, and dominated or 
distracted by the immediate pressures of the day. 
As Professor Slonim recounts, Madison had a very different vision 
of the Constitution from the one that actually emerged from the 
Convention.12 He could be described, at least at that time, as a radical 
nationalist or Federalist.13 His position was that “the states, as such, 
would have to be precluded from any role in the governing structure of 
the national authority, and secondly, the authority would be empow–
ered to exercise a supervisory veto over state legislation.”14 Both 
elements of this formulation were defeated in the Convention. The first, 
embodied in the Virginia Plan, was rejected in favor of the New Jersey 
Plan, which granted all states an equal vote in the legislature’s upper 
house, whose members were to be chosen by the state legislatures.15 
That body, where states and not citizens were represented, was then 
given the sole authority to approve treaties (by a two-thirds vote in 
fact) and to confirm presidential appointments. Madison’s proposal for 
a Congressional veto was modified and then rejected, with even his 
Federalist allies opposing it because they thought it would make 
ratification impossible.16 Several months after the Convention ended, 
Madison continued to bemoan the rejection of the veto as undermining 
the authority that he thought the central government needed to fulfill 
 
of the Debates have remained the standard authority for the proceedings 
of the Convention.”). The third volume of this definitive collection feat–
ures supplementary materials; mainly letters. Most of them are by people 
other than Madison, but he dominates the final 70 documents, which 
consist of later reminiscences about the Convention. See 3 id. at 434–551. 
10. See The Federalist Nos. 10, 14 (James Madison).  
11. Slonim, supra note 2, at 179–89. 
12. Id. at 31–32. 
13. Id. For his subsequent political gyrations, see Slonim, supra note 2, at 206–
18; see also Lynne Cheney, James Madison: A Life Reconsidered 
(2014); Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius, 
Partisan, President (2017). 
14. Slonim, supra note 2, at 32. 
15. Id. at 33–34, 39. 
16. Id. at 66–70. 
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its mission.17 As a strong or radical Federalist, Madison also believed 
that a bill of rights was an unnecessary constraint on the national 
legislature.18 The reason he acceded to Jefferson’s demand and drafted 
the document was not because he shared Jefferson’s belief in its 
necessity but because he realized that it would be the best way to fore–
stall demands by New York and Virginia Anti-Federalists for a second 
constitutional convention that might weaken the national government 
still further.19 In short, the Constitution is at best a wayward child, 
badly injured and debased by a rough world from which its parent could 
not shield it. 
Many of those injuries and debasements result from a second theme 
in Professor Slonim’s book—the role of the small states at the Conven–
tion. While the disproportionate influence that the Constitution, and 
specifically the Electoral College system, gives to smaller states is 
widely recognized, and commentators discern a resulting conservative 
bias, we do not think of small states as a separate interest group. The 
most common contrast notes that votes for President in Wyoming, a 
reliably red state, count for 3.6 times as much as votes in California, a 
reliably blue one.20 But the calculation yields an almost equal 
disproportion between Wyoming and Texas, also a red state, or between 
Texas and the next least populous state, Vermont, which is reliably 
blue.21 In other words, there is no politically salient difference between 
large and small states per se.22 Thus, the contemporary political signi–
 
17. Id. at 70–71; see also Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: 
James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of the Republican 
Government, 36 Wm. & Mary Q. 215, 216, 229–32 (1979). 
18.  Lesley Kennedy, Before Drafting the Bill of Rights, James Madison 
Argued the Constitution Was Fine Without It, History (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/news/bill-of-rights-constitution-first-10-
amendments-james-madison [https://perma.cc/CW65-9T42]. 
19. Slonim, supra note 2, at 163–75. 
20. See, e.g., Editorial Board, supra note 1; Petrocelli, supra note 1. 
21.  See United States Electoral College Votes by State, Encyc. Britannica 
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-States-Electoral-
College-Votes-by-State-1787124 [https://perma.cc/FPT3-C48G]. Wyoming 
and Vermont each have three electoral votes, while Texas has thirty-eight. 
Id. 
22. One scientist and mathematician, who measured impact against number 
of ballots cast, confirmed that small states are most advantaged by the 
Electoral College, with the eight states whose votes counted for more than 
twice the average being Wyoming, District of Columbia, Vermont, Alaska, 
Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and South Dakota, all with three or 
four electoral votes. Dale R. Durran, Whose Votes Count Least in the 
Electoral College?, Conversation (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:19 PM), http:// 
theconversation.com/whose-votes-count-the-least-in-the-electoral-college-
74280 [https://perma.cc/88SE-QKXJ]. All these states vote reliably in 
one direction or another, but exactly half vote blue and in fact are among 
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ficance of the Electoral College is not entirely clear. Professor Slonim 
explains, however, that the small states functioned as a unified interest 
group at the Constitutional Convention.23 Their concern was that the 
larger states, specifically Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, 
would use a strong central government to dominate them, and perhaps 
even destroy them.24 This led them to oppose Madison’s Virginia Plan 
with the New Jersey Plan that gave all states equal representation in 
the Senate and gave the Senate its authority over treaties and 
appointments. And it was directly responsible for the Electoral 
College.25 
The concerns of the smaller states, as Professor Slonim explains 
them, are understandable, but they are neither admirable nor far-
sighted. Each of the thirteen colonies had been administered separately 
by Britain.26 Although independence was declared by the newly formed 
Continental Congress, and the war against Britain was pursued under 
Congress’ auspices, the machinery of day-to-day governance of each 
state was in the hands of the local elites who had taken control of the 
colonial apparatus.27 It was natural for them to see the nation as 
separate polities that might engage in commercial or even military 
conflict, and for those who controlled the smaller states to ally with 
each other and assert disproportionate control over the central 
government.28 However understandable, this was certainly not admir–
able; it committed the common error of assuming that the interests of 
the governing elites were equivalent to the interests of the citizens, and 
that their continued control of the state government would be more 
beneficial for their citizens than any decision made by the majority of 
the nation.29 Neither was the alliance of small states particularly far-
sighted. It should not have required much imagination to realize that 
 
the most reliably Democratic states in the nation, none having voted 
Republican in the last seven presidential elections. See, e.g., David 
Weigel, The 50 Political States of America, Wash Post (Sept. 22, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/united-states-
political-geography/ [https://perma.cc/Z8G8-VYAY].  
23. Slonim, supra note 2, at 41. 
24. Id. at 35, 44.  
25. Id. at 41–46, 49–50. 
26. See Jon Butler, Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776, 
at 89–130 (2000); Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling 
of North America 117–272 (2001). 
27. See Robert M. Weir, Who Shall Rule at Home: The American Revolution 
as a Crisis of Legitimacy for the Colonial Elite, 6 J. Interdisc. Hist. 
679, 679–84 (1976). 
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
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the issues that would divide a functioning nation would not revolve 
around the size of its political subdivisions. The separate identity of the 
small states disappeared almost as soon as the nation was formed, to 
be replaced by more substantive divisions.30 But it left a powerful 
imprint on the constitutional design, one that we continue to live with 
long after the birth pains of the new nation had been forgotten. 
The most divisive of those substantive issues was slavery, and this 
also left an indelible imprint on the Constitution. As Professor Slonim 
notes, William Wiecek identifies ten clauses in the Constitution that 
explicitly refer to slavery,31 while Paul Finkelman identifies no fewer 
than fifteen.32 In fact, Slonim argues, every clause of the Constitution 
was influenced by the Southern states’ desire to protect their “peculiar 
institution.”33 It motivated the Southern delegates to increase the 
representation of the slave states in the House of Representatives 
through the three-fifths clause;34 to demand that the Senate be designed 
to represent states, rather than citizens who were more numerous in 
the North despite that clause;35 to insist that this Senate be given the 
exclusive role in approving treaties and ambassadors;36 to endorse a 
bizarre method of determining the election of the chief executive that 
gave decisive weight to the three-fifths-based House and the states-qua-
states Senate;37 to enumerate the powers granted to Congress in place 
of a general provision that might have permitted legislation regarding 
slavery; and to construct an elaborate method of amendment that 
demanded both a supermajority in the three-fifths-based House, the 
state-qua-states Senate, and the states themselves.38 Based on the 
picture that Professor Slonim paints for us, it is clear that slavery was 
never absent from the minds of the Southern delegates. Those provis–
 
30. Cf. Slonim, supra note 2, at 205, 214–15. 
31. Id. at 38 n.38 (citing William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: 
Slavery and the Constitution’s Origins, in The Framing and Ratification 
of the Constitution 167, 168 (Levy W. Mahoney & Dennis J. Mahoney 
eds., 1987)). 
32. Id. (citing Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: 
Making a Covenant with Death, in Beyond Confederation: Origins 
of the Constitution and American National Identity 188, 190–92 
(Richard R. Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward Carlos Carter, eds., 
1987)). 
33. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the 
Ante-Bellum South (1st ed. 1956); see Slonim, supra note 2, at 38–41. 
34. Slonim, supra note 2, at 38. 
35. Id. at 39.  
36. Id. at 45–46.  
37. Id. at 38–39. 
38. Id. at 37, 39. 
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ions that reflect a more democratic ethos, such as the requirement that 
money bills begin in the House, or that reflect a concern for human 
rights, such as the prohibition against bills of attainder, were adopted 
because there was no way to use them to abolish or diminish slavery.39 
The enumerated powers clause is a particularly notable example of 
this issue’s overwhelming influence. Madison’s original proposal for the 
powers of Congress, regarded throughout the Convention as the 
defining feature of federal authority, was that it would legislate “in all 
cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual [state] [l]egislation.”40 When the subject was discussed by the 
Convention as a whole, the slave state delegates objected, clearly 
concerned that it would empower a Northern controlled Congress to 
express its disapproval of slavery.41 Pierce Butler of South Carolina (the 
state that would subsequently start the Civil War42) declared: “The 
security the South[ern] States want is that their negroes not be taken 
from them which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very 
good mind to do.”43 But proposals to enumerate, and thereby limit, the 
powers of Congress were rejected by the Convention as a whole.44 
Because the Southern demand was insistent, and several of the leading 
nationalists such as James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris wanted a 
more precise formulation, the issue was referred to the Committee on 
Detail, chaired by John Rutledge, also of South Carolina.45 Contrary to 
the instructions of the Convention when referring the matter, Rutledge 
induced the Committee to produce a clause enumerating specific powers 
that were granted to Congress.46 Slonim concludes that “the prime 
consideration for enumeration was the demand of the slave states to 
ensure that the federal government not be empowered to interfere with 
the system of slavery.”47 The delegates accepted Rutledge’s revision of 
their original plan because they were aware that in this case, as in so 
 
39. Cf. id. at 36–41.  
40. Id. at 60 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 United States Constitutional 
Convention, supra note 9, app. C at 593 (The Virginia Plan)).  
41. Id. at 61–62. 
42. See David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of 
the Civil War 33–52 (2001); Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War 
Came: The North and the Session Crisis 85 (1950). 
43. Slonim, supra note 2, at 62 (quoting 1 United States Constitutional 
Convention, supra note 9, at 605). 
44. Id. at 62–63, 65. 
45. Id. at 65–66. 
46. Id. at 64. 
47. Id. at 65–66. 
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many others, a weakened federal government was the price of Southern 
agreement to the union. 
II. Slonim’s Lessons 
It is difficult, in general, to avoid drawing normative implications 
from history. It is impossible for a history of the Constitution, not only 
because the Constitution is so important to us, but also because public 
officials who must follow the Constitution regularly and explicitly 
invoke history to guide their actions. Thus, it is natural to ask what 
lessons we can learn from Professor Slonim’s account or—to be more 
specific—what can he tell us about the way we should interpret the 
document. The lesson that seems to emerge with striking clarity is that 
we should not treat the language of the Constitution with the sort of 
reverence and excessive attention that popular discourse and originalist 
scholars demand. In other words, based on the way Professor Slonim 
puts the Constitution in context as an historical matter, we should put 
it in its place as a normative matter. 
Of course, no constitutional scholar or political leader argues that 
we should ignore the language of the Constitution. It is enacted positive 
law and deserves the attention and obedience that attaches to such 
enactments in our legal system. The question is whether it merits 
additional respect as the pronouncement of people with unusual 
wisdom, or who were positioned at an unusually fortuitous time in our 
political history. In other words, should the Constitution be treated as 
ordinary law, to be interpreted in the light of current circumstances 
and evolving norms, or should we treat it as a higher law to be 
interpreted in accordance with its original meaning?48 
 
48. It is, of course, possible to argue that ordinary law, that is, statutes, should 
also be interpreted based on their original meaning. This does not correspond 
to any of the prevailing schools of statutory interpretation, however. 
Textualists are certainly opposed to approaches that allow the meaning of a 
statute to evolve over time, but they want to ground interpretation on the 
enacted language, not original intent. See generally Antonin Scalia, A 
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997); 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpret–
ation of Legal Texts (2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 533 n.2, 548 (1983). Justice Scalia’s insistence that 
legislative history should never be considered is emblematic of this focus on 
enacted language as opposed to intent. Those who argue that legislative 
history should be consulted want to treat it as one consideration, not an 
exclusive principle, and generally favor the idea of evolving meaning as well. 
See, e.g., Robert Katzmann, Judging Statutes 35, 39 (2014); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
405, 428–29, 493 (1989). 
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In the Western world, approaches to authoritative texts derive from 
the interpretation of Scripture.49 Over the course of the two millennia 
of Christianity, there have been a variety of approaches, but the 
Modern Era is dominated by the rivalry between Catholic and 
Protestant interpretation, one of the main theoretical issues that define 
these contesting faiths.50 Catholics believe that there is a human agency 
on Earth that can provide definitive interpretations of the text—the 
Church, headed by the Pope.51 Thus, the understanding of the text can 
change in response to changing circumstances, not because the text is 
wrong, but because its significance for people’s lives is revealed over 
time through authoritative interpretation.52 Protestants believe that 
 
49. See generally Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism: 
And Other Writings (Andrew Bowie ed. & trans., 1998) (developing a 
method of interpreting the language used within biblical text); Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem, in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics 3, 17 (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976) (“Language occurs 
once again, in vocabulary and grammar as always, and never without the inner 
infinity of the dialogue that is in progress between every speaker and his 
partner. That is the fundamental dimension of hermeneutics.”); Richard E. 
Palmier, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (1969) (comparing and contrasting 
definitions of hermeneutics and the perspective of foundational theorists). The 
tradition of modern literary analysis in the Western world is generally regarded 
as beginning with Schleiermacher’s interpretation of the Bible. Nasrullah 
Mambrol, Literary Criticism of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Literary and 
Theory Criticism: Literariness (Dec. 23, 2017), https://literariness.org/ 
2017/12/23/literary-criticism-of-friedrich-schleiermacher/ [https://perma.cc/ 
H43C-B2 72] (“The German philosopher and Protestant theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher . . . is generally credited with having laid the foundations of 
modern hermeneutics, or the art of systematic textual interpretation.”). 
50. Protestants identify five Solae as distinguishing their version of Christianity 
from that of the Catholic Church. John Barber, The Road from Eden: 
Studies in Christianity and Culture 233 (2008) (“The message of the 
Lutheran and Reformed theologians has been codified into a simple set of 
five Latin phrases: Sola Scriptura (Scripture alone), Solus Christus (Christ 
alone), Sola Fide (faith alone), Sola Gratia (by grace alone) and Soli Deo 
Gloria (glory to God alone).”). 
51. See, e.g., Bible Can Only be Understood with the Church, Pope Tells Scholars, 
Cath. News Agency (Apr. 23, 2009, 11:00 AM), https://www.catholic 
newsagency.com/news/bible_can_only_be_understood_with_the_church
_pope_tells_scholars [https://perma.cc/PET9-S3Y5] (quoting Pope Benedict 
XVI, Address at the Pontifical Biblical Commission’s Plenary Assembly (Apr. 
23, 2009)) (“[A] correct understanding of Scripture . . . rises from the Tradition 
of the Church.”). 
52. See generally Christopher McMahon, Reading the Gospels: Biblical 
Interpretation in the Catholic Tradition (2012); Peter S. Williamson, 
Catholic Principles for Interpreting Scripture, 65 Cath. Biblical Q. 327, 
336 (2003) (recognizing the principle that “the Bible itself and the history of 
its interpretation demonstrate a pattern of re-reading texts in the light of new 
circumstances”). 
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there is no such human agency, but rather that the true interpretation 
resides in the text itself, and each generation of people must refer back 
to that original text for authoritative guidance.53 
The way in which these theories of Biblical interpretation have been 
translated into constitutional law is obvious, but one aspect of the 
analogy merits emphasis in exploring the significance of Professor 
Slonim’s book. The Catholic approach, which clearly informs the theory 
of an evolving Constitution, depends on accepting both the authority 
of the judiciary and the force of precedent. The analogy is imperfect, of 
course, because the Supreme Court does not claim to be directly 
inspired by the Framers nor infallible in its interpretations. But the 
force of the analogy lies in the common idea that the text, although 
authoritative, is a product of its times, that is, the text spoke to people 
in the language of its day and thus must be reframed for people of a 
later era by agents that the text itself empowers. The Protestant 
approach, which informs originalism, is that each era must approach 
the text anew and has the authority to correct prior misinterpre–
tations.54 Again, the analogy is imperfect because no originalist asserts 
that the Constitution was written by an omniscient being who could 
speak directly and comprehensibly to people in a future time. But the 
force of this analogy is that the Framers of the Constitution were 
unusually wise and prescient human beings who could craft a document 
that transcended the particular concerns of the time when it was 
drafted. 
Professor Slonim’s account of the Constitution’s framing refutes 
this originalist image of its authors. The men who gathered in Phila–
delphia in the summer of 1787 were not a group of sages or Platonic 
Guardians meeting in some empyrean realm to contemplate the long-
 
53. See generally Joel R. Beeke, Sinclair B. Ferguson, W. Robert 
Godfrey, Ray Lanning, John MacArthur, R.C. Sproul, Derek W.H. 
Thomas & James White, Sola Scriptura!: The Protestant Position 
on the Bible 3 (Don Kistler ed., 2009) (describing the Protestant position 
“that all things necessary for salvation and concerning faith and life are 
taught in the Bible clearly enough for the ordinary believer to find it there 
and understand”); Keith A. Mathison, The Shape of Sola Scriptura 
(2001) (defending the ancient doctrine regarding Christian scriptures as the 
exclusive source of authority); John C. Peckham, Canonical Theology: 
The Biblical Canon, Sola Scriptura, and Theological Method 
(2016) (developing a detailed theological approach to the doctrine of Sola 
Scriptura). 
54. See, e.g., Keith Bartholomew, Biblical and Constitutional Interpretation 
and the Role of Originalism in Sixteenth and Twentieth-Century Societies, 
82 Anglican Theological Rev. 537, 538 (2000) (citation omitted) (“By 
originalism, I refer to the hermeneutical approach used by both biblical 
and constitutional scholars (and followed by millions of lay persons) that 
accords binding authority to the strict text of the source document or to 
the intentions if its authors or adopters.”). 
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term future of a new nation that would someday assume a dominant 
position in the world. They were, for the most part, ordinary politicians 
thinking in terms of their particularized concerns. To be sure, they were 
confronting large issues with long-term significance. The government 
that had been established to declare the independence of the thirteen 
colonies and carry out the resulting war was failing as a means of 
managing the nation that had emerged from these events.55 The task 
confronting the delegates to the Convention, therefore, was to design a 
political system rather than a specific statute. In doing so, however, 
they were motivated by the same sorts of immediate concerns that are 
almost universally recognized as the motivations for legislators in more 
ordinary situations.56 They protected their personal political position in 
their home states,57 based their votes on whether their home state was 
large or small,58 protected slavery because they themselves, as well as 
their important supporters, were slave holders,59 and reflected the 
immediate and not necessarily well-founded fears of their constituents.60 
There were obvious exceptions, including Benjamin Franklin, 
George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton. But Franklin, elderly 
and somewhat debilitated, generally limited himself to urging compro–
mise and unity,61 while Washington, already an icon, tended to remain 
 
55. Slonim, supra note 2, at 1–10. 
56. See generally John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (3d 
ed. 1989) (examining the decision-making process underlying legislative 
voting decisions); David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral 
Connection (1974) (describing how the quest for reelection motivates 
almost all elected legislators’ conduct); Steven S. Smith & Gerald 
Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in Congress 
Reconsidered 163 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., Sage 
11th ed 2017) (emphasizing the need to distinguish between the policy and 
electoral goals of congressional parties). 
57. See, e.g., Slonim, supra note 2, at 96 (describing how recently-elected 
Governor of Virginia Edmund Randolph refused to sign the Constitution 
because he was concerned about local opposition from Patrick Henry and 
Richard Henry Lee). 
58. Id. at 41–50. 
59. Id. at 59–63, 64. 
60. See id. at 36–37, 40–41, 47–48. 
61. See Beeman, supra note 5, at 52 (“[W]eakened by age and painful kidney 
stones—and less convinced of the need for dramatic change—he was 
unlikely to supply either the energy or the ideas for a revolution in 
government.”); see also Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An 
American Life 445–54 (2003). Franklin wanted to raise objections to 
slavery at the Convention, but was persuaded by other Northern delegates 
that it would endanger ratification of the Constitution. Joseph J. Ellis, 
Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation 110–11 
(2000). 
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neutral in his role as president of the Convention.62 The most important 
exception was James Madison. As Professor Slonim recounts, Madison 
seems to have been motivated by a genuine desire to create a strong 
central government,63 a position he would soon repudiate.64 But he was 
also an exception for being the one active participant who was truly an 
extraordinary political thinker, worthy of being ranked with the great 
theorists in the Western tradition. Ironically, his political theory was 
grounded on the insight that government cannot teach virtue to its 
citizens, and cannot rely on the virtue of its leaders, but will always be 
a contest among self-interested individuals and factions.65 He himself, 
on the basis of this theory, sought to create a strong central government 
that could counteract the more particularized interests of the separate 
states, but saw his vision eviscerated by the very process that he 
declared unavoidable, and that formed the basis of his approach to 
governance. As for Hamilton, he was at this time entirely allied with 
Madison; thus, whatever his excellence of mind, his views suffered the 
same degree of frustration.66 
Because originalism is subject to well-known conceptual defects, 
such as the difficulty of determining the intent of a collective body and 
the difficulty of discerning the intentions of people in the distant past,67 
some scholars who claim to be originalists have sought to distance their 
approaches from the actual intentions of the delegates at the 
Convention. One such approach is to shift attention to the intentions 
of the ratifying conventions in the states, on the ground that it was 
their actions that established the Constitution as authoritative law.68 
Professor Slonim’s book challenges this view as well, and for the same 
reason. The state ratifying conventions displayed the same mixture or 
mélange of personal motivations and quotidian political interests as the 
drafting Convention in Philadelphia.69 Several of the small states 
 
62. Beeman, supra note 5, at 110; Rakove, supra note 5, at 136; Joseph J. 
Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington 177 (2004) (“Washington 
was simultaneously the most important person at the Constitutional 
Convention and the least involved in the debate that shaped the document 
that emerged. His importance was a function of his presence . . . .”). 
63. Slonim, supra note 2, at 32 (“Madison was a supreme nationalist.”). 
64. Id. at 205–07. 
65. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). 
66. See generally The Federalist No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton); Slonim, 
supra note 2, at 17.  
67. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 214, 221–22 (1980). 
68. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 5 Const. Comment. 77, 85–93 (1988). 
69. See, e.g., Slonim, supra note 2, at 127–51.  
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hastened to ratify because they realized that they had gotten such a 
sweet deal from the Convention.70 John Hancock, fortuitously recover–
ing from a case of gout that had kept him home while he weighed his 
options, came out in favor of ratification and swayed the vote in 
Massachusetts because the Federalists promised him the Vice-
Presidency of the new nation, or the Presidency if George Washington 
proved to be ineligible due to Virginia’s failure to ratify.71 The Anti-
Federalists, in the majority at the New York State convention, were 
motivated to ratify because they simultaneously hoped that New York 
City would be chosen as the nation’s capital if they did so and feared 
that the City would secede from the State, for commercial reasons, if 
they didn’t.72 
A second and more formidable effort to distance originalism from 
the actual intent of the Framers is the invocation of original public 
meaning. This is a complex theory that, at its outer limits, views the 
Constitution as an evolving process that would be only vaguely 
informed by an historical account of its origins such as Professor 
Slonim’s book.73 In its more delimited form, the claim is that the proper 
interpretation of a constitutional provision should not be based on the 
Framers’ personal or subjective views about the language they enacted, 
but rather on the general understanding of that language at the time 
of enactment.74 Whatever problems with the theory of originalism that 
 
70. See id. at 49–50, 134. 
71. Id. at 130–31. 
72. Id. at 149. 
73. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. 
Comment. 291, 303–04 (2007); cf. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and 
Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 447–51 (2007) 
(arguing that originalism is a commitment to the principles of the 
Constitution rather than how the framers meant for their words to apply 
to future generations). 
74. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty 89–94 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Cons–
titutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and 
Judicial Review 35–37 (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. 
L.J. 1113, 1132–33 (2003) (advocating that originalism pays attention to how 
the words and phrases of the Constitution “would have been understood by a 
hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those words and 
phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted”); Gary Lawson, Proving 
the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859, 875 (1992) (recognizing public opinion at 
the time of Constitutional ratification is one method of interpretation); Samuel 
T. Morison, The Crooked Timber of Liberal Democracy, 2005 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 461, 465 (2005). A related idea is that determining the original meaning 
of the Constitution should rely on extra-legal sources. See Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1935 (2013), 
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this idea resolves, it does not rescue originalism from the implications 
of Slonim’s observations. 
The men who gathered in Philadelphia were members of the elite, 
certainly among the best educated people in the nation. There were a 
sufficient number of them to wash out truly idiosyncratic uses of 
language, so that their actual intent, assuming it can be discerned, 
would have been reasonably close to the public meaning of the 
American elite as a whole. If the general public meaning of the language 
was different, it would be because it included the views of much less 
educated people, including subsistence farmers living in fairly isolated 
settings.75 The normative argument for treating this larger group of 
people with reverence, and granting their views more weight than their 
mere enactment of positive law would demand, is rather weak. Professor 
Slonim does not attempt to discern the views of this larger public, but 
to the extent that they are reflected in his account of the leading 
political actors, the dominant mood seems to have been fear—fear by 
slaveholders that their slaves would be taken away, fear by residents of 
small states that they would be conquered by their larger neighbors, 
fear of internal rebellion by disadvantaged regions of the nation,76 and 
fear by everyone that the new nation would fall prey to the great powers 
that were hovering around them, specifically Britain, France, and 
Spain.77 People who are afraid of things that we are not afraid of now 
are not a particularly convincing source of wisdom. 
If we proceed from theories of interpreting the U.S. Constitution to 
theories of constitutionalism itself, Professor Slonim provides a similar 
lesson. One of the best-known theories of the constitutional meaning is 
Jon Elster’s idea of self-binding, which he derives from the story of 
Ulysses and the Sirens.78 Knowing that the Sirens’ song will irresistibly 
 
1973–75 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: 
The Precedents and Principles We Live By 247–48 (2012)).  
75. See Morris D. Forkosch, Who are the “People” in the Preamble to the 
Constitution?, 19 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 644, 676–81 (1968). There is, 
moreover, the sticky question of whether to include among the public 
those who were excluded at the time, but whom we would insist on 
including at present, such as African-Americans, Native Americans, and 
women, collectively the majority of the nation’s inhabitants. See id. at 
684–85, 708–09.  
76. See Slonim, supra note 2, at 33–39, 53 n.28, 131. Specifically, “Shays’ 
Rebellion” was an internal rebellion arranged by farmers as a response to 
their desperate economic circumstance. Id. at 20–23.  
77. See id. at 4, 23–24, 47. 
78. Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommit–
ment, and Constraints 88–92 (2000); Jon Elster, Ulysses and the 
Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 39–47 (1979) [herein–
after Ulysses and the Sirens]. 
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attract all those who hear it to abandon their voyage and die on the 
Sirens’ island, Ulysses instructs his sailors to stop their ears with wax. 
He, however, lashes himself to the mast of the ship and instructs the 
sailors to keep him bound, no matter how insistently he entreats or, 
being the captain, commands them to release him.79 Elster takes this as 
a general pattern of rational action, where actors at Time One make a 
definitive commitment that constrains their actions at Time Two, when 
their rationality may be impaired.80 He then suggests that a Consti–
tution operates in this manner.81 The Framers, realizing that the 
confusions and conflicts that will afflict a polity in a momentary crisis 
may lead it to abandon its principles, embody those principles in a set 
of rules intended to constrain such deviations.82 
It is an inspiring image, and one that supports a mode of 
interpretation that features fidelity to the original text of the 
Constitution, and perhaps an originalist orientation. But it depends on 
the assumption that the actors at Time One are more rational than at 
Time Two, that they can think in more principled and less circum–
stantial terms.83 Professor Slonim’s account refutes this claim. He 
demonstrates that the Framers were subject to the same confusions and 
conflicts that affected future generations.84 They were just as bound by 
their personal interests, their prejudices, and the immediate stresses of 
 
79. Homer, The Odyssey bk. XII, 441–43 (Maynard Mack ed., Alexander 
Pope trans., London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1967) (“I give the sign, and 
struggle to be free: Swift row my mates, and shoot along the sea; New 
chains they add, and rapid urge the way, ‘Till dying off, the distant sounds 
decay . . . .”). 
80. Ulysses and the Sirens, supra note 78, at 39–47.  
81. Id. at 88–174. 
82. Id.  
83. In fact, I have argued previously that Elster is wrong about both 
constitutions and The Odyssey. See Edward L. Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization, 
47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 631, 637 (2012). A constitution is not a case of 
self-binding, as he asserts. A higher authority, the convention or 
constitutional assembly, makes a law that binds subsequently selected 
officials, just the way an ordinary statute binds those that are subject to it. 
Unlike a legislature, the convention then passes out of existence, but this is 
not the same thing as self-binding. Id. at 639–41. And in The Odyssey, 
Ulysses does not decide to bind himself to the mast. A god, Circe, orders 
him to do so, and Ulysses obeys because obedience to the gods is one of his 
virtues, as established in the invocation. See Homer, supra note 79, at 28–
29, 430–33. In other words, Elster ignores the crucial issue of obedience to 
law in using the image of Ulysses and the mast, possibly because he ignores 
the issue of obedience in the original source. As argued here, we should not 
treat the Constitution as the pronouncement of hyper-rational beings whom 
we must revere, but as enacted law that we are required to obey that is 
subject to interpretation on the basis of changed circumstances. 
84. See Slonim, supra note 2, at 127–51. 
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their time as those who would be governed by the document that they 
devised. Indeed, as just described, they either constituted or answered 
to a public that was besieged by fear bordering on panic. Madison was 
the exception (and Hamilton perhaps another), but Slonim 
demonstrates that their vision for the national government was altered, 
and indeed eviscerated, by the other delegates. What emerged then, 
was not an optimal and timeless framework for the future, but a set of 
makeshift provisions and patched-together compromises that would 
provide a solution to the pressing problems of the time when the 
document was drafted. 
Again, while none of this means that the text of the Constitution 
should be ignored, Professor Slonim’s book strongly suggests that the 
reverential attitude toward the Framers that characterizes much of our 
constitutional interpretation, particularly by judges and scholars who 
regard themselves as originalists, is unjustified.85 Most of the Framers 
were ordinary people subject to ordinary motivations, and, as such, are 
entitled to no more deference or attention than their enactment itself 
would demand. It can nonetheless be argued that the Constitution’s 
text or intent is entitled to greater deference because it is an organic 
enactment for the nation as a whole. The countervailing argument, of 
course, is that the Constitution’s generality, and the fact that it was 
written long ago by people who thought differently and faced different 
issues, requires that it be interpreted flexibly if it is serve our purposes, 
rather than frustrate them.86 This is a debate about interpretive theory 
and cannot be resolved by an historical study such as Professor 
Slonim’s. What his study suggests, however, is that the argument for 
originalism must rest on this debate and cannot rely on arguments or 
imagery about the superior wisdom, rationality, or impartiality of the 
Constitution’s authors.  
The implication that flows from this conclusion is that consti–
tutional provisions should be strictly enforced when they are supported 
by some external norm to which we as a society are committed. In 
particular, those provisions that protect human rights, such as the First 
Amendment and the guarantees of equal protection and procedural due 
process, are grounded in strong norms which are important to us, while 
structural provisions such as federalism and the separation of powers 
should be recognized as pragmatic arrangements that can be varied 
 
85. See id. (demonstrating that the Framers were ordinary people subject to 
the same motivations as modern politicians). 
86. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819) (“This 
provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, 
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”); 
see also Brandon J. Murrill, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45129, Modes 
of Constitutional Interpretation 7, 9–10 (2018).  
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because they do not implicate such norms or commitments.87 This is, of 
course, the position set out in footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products,88 and that became the central theme of the Legal Process 
School’s approach to constitutional interpretation.89 The footnote, 
which emerged out of the Supreme Court’s rejection of substantive due 
process,90 was based on the idea that the Court should not intrude into 
 
87. The argument that these structural features secure political and human rights 
is too parochial to be accepted. The two independent organizations that rate 
the level of democracy throughout the world give their highest rating to a 
number of nations that have parliamentary systems with no separation of the 
executive and the legislature, or unitary systems with no legal autonomy for 
geographic subunits of the nation, or both. These organizations give the United 
States, despite the structural features of the Constitution, a slightly lower 
rating. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, at 10, 106, 470, 
480, 653, 700–01, 953, 1058, 1064 (Arch Puddington, ed., 2018) (on a 1 (best) 
to 7 scale for two elements of freedom, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and 
United Kingdom receive a 1.0, while the United States receives a lower 1.5 
rating, the same as Belize and Mongolia); The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Democracy Index, Economist, https://infographics.economist.com/2019/ 
DemocracyIndex/ [https://perma.cc/SQ6W-QLP5] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) 
(on a 1 (worst) to 10 scale, the ratings are: Germany, 8.68, Japan, 7.99, 
Netherlands, 8.89, Sweden, 9.39, while the United States is rated 7.96, about 
the same as Botswana and Estonia); see also Italy: Main Executive and 
Legislative Bodies, Eurydice (Mar. 6, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://eacea.ec. 
europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/content/main-executive-and-legislative-
bodies-39_en [https://perma.cc/NXZ5-2EEN]; Government and Society: 
Constitutional Framework, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/ 
Japan/Government-and-society [https://perma.cc/GT5D-ZDZ7] (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2020); Chuka Nwanazia, The Trias Politica: Dutch System of 
Government and Why it Matters, DutchReview (May 23, 2018), 
https://dutchreview.com/culture/society/the-trias-politica-dutch-system-of-
government/ [https:// perma.cc/J4CQ-77EN]; National Parliaments: Sweden, 
Libr. Cong. (July 24, 2020), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/national-
parliaments/sweden.php [https://perma.cc/3UC4-9WW8]; The Three Bran-
ches of Government, LawWales, https://law.gov.wales/constitution-govern 
ment/intro-to-constitution/three-branches-government/?lang=en#/ constitu 
tion-government/intro-to-constitution/three-branches-government/?tab=over 
view&lang=en [https://perma.cc/57VV-3TV9] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
88. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
89. See Choper, supra note 6, at 75; Ely, supra note 6, at 75–76, 151–53; A. 
Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence 
and the New Legal Process (Book Review), 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1071, 1081 
& n.65 (1988). 
90. The definitive case, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, had been decided the 
previous term. 300 U.S. 379, 389–91, 400 (1937) (holding that substantive 
due process rights do not exist that can prevent states from restricting the 
terms of private contracts when they are acting to protect the welfare of 
citizens). West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 
U.S. 525 (1923), and distinguished Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 
298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
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democratic decisions except to correct defects in the political process 
itself, such as denial of the right to vote.91 Legal Process scholars, 
unwilling to restrict human rights protection to such a narrow compass, 
developed the idea that all human rights should be protected by the 
Court because they defend against the tyranny of the majority (a 
central concern of Madison’s) whereas structural provisions would be 
enforced by majoritarian politics,92 such as the role of the states in the 
national legislature that the Framers established over Madison’s 
objection. Professor Slonim’s book suggests a third rationale for this 
same principle, namely, that the Framers were ordinary politicians 
whose pronouncements possess no greater normative force than ordin–
ary legislation, and that constitutional provisions should be interpreted 
with the usual flexibility and concern for practicality and efficiency 
unless they can derive their normative value from some other source.93 
III. The Electoral College 
Of the Constitution’s structural features, the one that is perhaps 
most strange and convoluted is the Electoral College. George Edwards 
III and Sanford Levinson have stated the basic argument against it, 
which is that it is inconsistent with our current conception of democ–
racy.94 Arguments in favor are notoriously weak, often little more than 
 
91. The footnote is composed of two elements. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
The first is that “[i]t is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation 
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more 
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.” Id. The second is 
that “[n]or need we enquire whether . . . prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.” Id. at 153 n.4. As is apparent from the 
language, both elements point to defects in the political process as the 
basis of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 152 n.4. 
92. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme 
Court at the Bar of Politics 18–19 (2d ed. 1962); Choper, supra note 
6, at 4–6, 9–10; The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison); Jeffrey Rosen, 
America is Living James Madison’s Nightmare, Atlantic (October 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/james-madison-
mob-rule/568351/ [https://perma.cc/HBJ4-FLA8]; William N. Eskridge Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
2031, 2031, 2042 (1994); Kent Roach, What’s New and Old About the Legal 
Process, 47 U. Toronto L.J. 363, 374, 393 (1997). 
93. See supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text.  
94. George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College is Bad for 
America 150–51, 157–58 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Putting the Constitution in its Place 
34 
generalized objections to change.95 As Professor Slonim’s account ex-
plains, the device was an improvised alternative to majority voting or 
legislative selection, designed to appease the fears of the small states 
and incorporating the inequalities that had already been established to 
appease the fears of the slave states.96 It seemed like an acceptable 
solution at a time when democracy was still an untried experiment, 
when the British system of representation that the Framers knew 
imposed highly restrictive property qualifications on the grounds that 
only a small elite could be expected to vote responsibly,97 and when the 
other leading examples of electoral regimes were the Ancient Greek city-
states reflected through the accounts of Aristotle, Plutarch, and Cicero, 
where Rome and Sparta were more admired than Athens.98 Things have 
changed since then. The Western world has more than two centuries of 
experience with democracy, much of it successful, and our current view 
 
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We 
the People Can Correct It) 81–83, 85–91, 95–97 (2006). 
95. See, e.g., Tara Ross, Why We Need the Electoral College 32 
(2017) (“The Founders’ Constitution employs an elaborate system of 
checks, balances, and separated powers . . . [e]liminating any one of them 
is certain to have unintended and potentially devastating consequences.”); 
John O. McGinnis, Popular Sovereignty and the Electoral College, 29 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 995, 995 (2001) (“[A]n electoral system designed to distill 
the will of a national majority would have a tendency to lead to notions 
of social democracy that are foreign to the American experience . . . .”); 
John Yoo, A Defense of the Electoral College in the Age of Trump, 46 
Pepp. L. Rev. 833, 860 (2019) (“If we should discard with the Electoral 
College as an obstacle to the majority, critics should explain why the 
American people should retain the Constitution’s other limits on pure 
majoritarian democracy. . . . Why not replace [American separation of 
powers] with a British-style parliament . . . ?”). 
96. Slonim, supra note 2, at 39–41. 
97. Donald Ratcliffe, The Right to Vote and the Rise of Democracy, 1787–1828, 
33 J. Early Republic 219, 220–21 (2013); Pat Stuart, Voting: The Great 
American Experiment, Powell Trib. (May 19, 2020, 8:05 AM), 
https://www.powelltribune.com/stories/voting-the-great-american-
experiment, 25446 [https://perma.cc/24FY-4YH6]. This view, widely accep–
ted in the eighteenth century, became one of the dominant political issues of 
the nineteenth century, but even after two reform bills, only a small majority 
of the most prosperous people in England had the right to vote for members 
of Parliament. See 4 Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-
Speaking Peoples: The Great Democracies 45–54 (1958); 3 G.M. 
Trevelyan, History of England 158–60, 163, 170–80, 182–84, 186–89, 
191, 203–04 (3d ed. 1945); see also Malcolm Chase, Chartism: A New 
History 2 (2007) (discussing the first Reform Bill). 
98. See Paul Cartledge, Democracy 293–97, 299, 301–04 (2016); Gordon 
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is that the citizens themselves should decide. But the Electoral College 
system persists. Instead of being lashed to the mast of rationality, we 
are confined below decks in the ship of state’s scullery, amidst the 
outworn and grimy utensils left over from earlier times. 
A possible escape route from this artifact of the Convention’s 
eighteenth-century conflicts is at hand. The National Popular Vote 
Interstate Compact (NPV) is an agreement among a group of states to 
award their electoral votes to the candidate who receives the largest 
popular vote, regardless of who achieves a majority of the popular votes 
in that state.99 The agreement will only go into effect if states with more 
than 270 electoral votes join; at that point, it will determine the 
election.100 Currently, 16 jurisdictions with 196 electoral votes have 
joined, almost all tending to vote Democratic in presidential elections.101 
Prospects for obtaining agreement of states with the remaining 74 votes 
are uncertain, but far from impossible.102 If these are obtained, however, 
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there will then be a legal challenge to NPV on the ground that it 
constitutes an “interstate compact” for which the Constitution requires 
Congressional approval.103 
There is substantial uncertainty about whether the NPV falls 
within the prohibition of this clause. While it would appear to be a 
compact among the states, the Supreme Court has held that only 
agreements “tending to the increase of political power in the States, 
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the 
United States” require Congressional approval.104 Scholars have 
expressed a variety of conflicting views about whether the NPV would 
constitute such an encroachment.105 They have also disagreed on 
whether the NPV would infringe on the rights of states that were not 
party to the agreement.106 But the odds are that the current Court 
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would strike down the NPV on one ground or another. Although it is 
generally advisable to avoid vulgar political realism when discussing the 
Court, the fact remains that the conservative majority of the last two 
decades has repeatedly decided cases with direct and significant 
political consequences in favor of the Republican party, often on 
grounds that seem questionable, at best.107 
Professor Slonim’s book suggests that this would be the wrong 
decision. No independent norms support the complex and idiosyncratic 
Electoral College system.108 In fact, our prevailing norm of democracy—
that the majority should decide—runs strongly in the opposite 
direction. The argument for interpreting the Electoral College 
provisions, and the interstate compact provision that might protect it, 
in a strict rather than flexible manner must therefore rest on a belief 
that these provisions represent some particularly wise and prescient 
vision on the part of the Framers. In fact, they represent nothing of the 
sort. The Framers in general were ordinary politicians, responding to 
the crises of their times and the misconceptions of the moment on the 
basis of self-interest, prejudice, and compromise. In crafting the 
Electoral College, they were motivated by a sense of small state identity 
that quickly disappeared and a commitment to slavery that we now 
regard an anathema. It is time to put these provisions in their place. 
They are law, but they are old law that should be flexibly interpreted 
in light of current norms and circumstances. 
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